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Evidence Problems Under Ohio Supreme Court
Rule XXVII
Well, your Honor, there we come into the question of what are the rules
of evidence that govern this panel.... I have examined the rules in
this procedure and I don't know what the rules of evidence are.'
At the beginning of 1957, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted amended
Rule XXVII as the exclusive procedure regulating disciplinary and re-
instatment hearings.? The purposes of the amended rule' are essentially:
(1) to set forth a comprehensive procedure under which the Ohio
Supreme Court can exercise its inherent authority over the conduct of
Ohio's attorneys;' and (2) to provide for a uniform system of disciplinary
proceedings throughout Ohio.5
The amended rule authorizes a seventeen-member Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline (hereinafter referred to as the
Board) to serve as an arm of the court in conducting hearings. A panel
of three commissioners is to hear evidence upon filing of a complaint
against an attorney by a local bar association.6 If the panel makes a find-
ing against the attorney charged and a majority of the board approves
the finding, the respondent has resort to the Ohio Supreme Court under
an "order to show cause" why the Board's report should not be con-
firmed.7
While the conduct and intial review of the proceedings by the Board
are administrative in practice, the safeguards of a judicial hearing are
preserved. Rule XXVII provides:
1. Record, vol. 1, p. 315, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d
493 (1958). To this question by counsel for respondent, the chairman of the hearing panel
replied: ". . . because of the fact that we are a creature of the Supreme Court of the State of
Ohio and that we are merely taking the place of other procedure which has always been fol-
lowed in the lower courts,... we would necessarily be required to follow the ordinary rules
of evidence as we lawyers know them in the courts."
2. OHio Sup. CT. R. XXVII, 167 Ohio St. lxxvi-lxxxiv (1958).
3. Rule XXVII is, in part, adapted from the Model Rules of Court for Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, approved by the American Bar Association in 1956. See 81 A.B.A. REP. 481-89
(1956). A number of changes recommended in the minority report, id. at 479-80, were
incorporated into OHio Sup. CT. R. XXVII §§ 6 and 21. The member of the American Bar
Association who filed its minority report also served on the committee which drafted the Ohio
rule.
4. In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 427, 132 N.E.2d 113, 118 (1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 965; In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909); cf. Mahoning County Bar
Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 20, 151 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1958).
5. Reply Brief for Ohio State Bar Association, Amicus Curiae, p. 16, In the Matter of
Amendment of Court Rule No. XXVII (Ohio 1956).
6. OHIO SUP. CT. R. XXVII 5§ 2, 3, 8, and 9.
7. Id. at § 16.
NOTES
All rules of evidence shall be observed in the conduct of all hearings,
and the Respondent may be represented by counsel who shall enter
formal appearance.8
Despite this comprehensive requirement, more specific provisions in Rule
XXVII necessarily preclude the application of certain technical rules of
evidence to disciplinary proceedings.9 Only a small minority of states
include such an evidentiary requirement in their rules."0 A significant
number of states hold that disciplinary proceedings are "not circum-
scribed by technical rules of evidence usually attendant on the trial of
an action in the courts."" These latter states apparently recognize that
the special nature of disciplinary proceedings raises evidentiary problems
which require a departure from established rules in ordinary actions.
While tracing some of these problems which have arisen in recent dis-
ciplinary and reinstatement cases under Rule XXVII and comparing them
with similar problems treated in other jurisdictions, this article may offer
some suggestions as to how they may be approached in Ohio."2
APPLICATION OF THE RULES
Disciplinary Proceedings - Civil or Quasi-Criminal?
Rule XXVII makes no specific statement as to whether disciplinary
proceedings are to be regarded as civil or criminal in nature.'8 How-
ever in In re Lieberman, decided less than two years before the adoption
of amended Rule XXVII, the Ohio Supreme Court declared:
We believe and, therefore, hold, that the degree of proof required in
a disbarment proceeding is that required in an ordinary civil action, a
preponderance of the evidence.' 4
8. Id. at § 34.
9. See Omo Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 5 (admissibility of criminal conviction as substantive
evidence), and § 7 (admissibility of prior order of public reprimand). The requirement of
adherence to "all rules of evidence" appears to contravene the more general provision that
"the process and procedure under this rule... shall be as summary as reasonably may be." Id.
37.
10. A.MENDED RULEs GOVERNING CONDuCT OF ATrYs. IN ALA., § B(22); S.C. Sup. CT.
RULES, DISCIPLINARY PROC., § 24.
11. State v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 417, 431 (Fla. 1959). OKLA. BAR ASS'N REv. R., pt. 1
9 16 (e); In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953). The Arizona court said in regard
to the provision that the rules of evidence are to apply "as far as practicable."
"This section of the rule prevents a star chamber inquisitorial proceeding while providing
for a hearing that comports with the concept of due process yet leaving those charged with
conducting the investigation free of the rigid rules governing proceedings in court." Id. at
53, 258 P.2d at 436. See also, UTAH STATE BAR, REv. RULES OF DISCIPLINE, rule iv, 5
42 (hearings conducted as shall best arrive at the truth).
12. Especially problems raised in Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148
NE.2d 493, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958), 171 Ohio St. 546 (1961) (reinstatement
hearing).
13. At least one Ohio court in the past has determined that a disciplinary proceeding is
"neither a civil action nor a criminal prosecution, but partakes of some of the attributes of
each." In re Dombey, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 36, 40 (C.P. 1954).
14. In re Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 43, 125 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1955).
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This opinion is in line with prior decisions of the court and with the
majority view in other jurisdictions.'5 Lower courts, however, before
the supreme court's latest pronouncement, have not always taken the
same view. In some cases, disbarment proceedings were defined as
quasi-criminal and a higher degree of proof was required than in ordinary
civil cases.' 6 Despite the statement of principles of the Ohio Bar Asso-
ciation and the American Bar Association that the purpose of discipline
is "not the punishment of the person disciplined,"'" the United States
Supreme Court has stated that disbarment proceedings are "not of the
ordinary run of civil cases."'" While an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended by a preponderance of the evidence showing misconduct, he
may nevertheless be entitled to certain of the privileges of an accused in
a criminal proceeding. To what extent, then, are the privileges and rules
of evidence in criminal cases appropriate to disciplinary proceedings?
Compulsory Testimony
In formulating a policy on compulsory testimony the Board looked
to the Ohio Supreme Court's declaration in the Lieberman case. With
supp6rt from a California case,' 9 the Board adopted the position that as in
civil cases, the
respondent-may be called to tesify at a hearing before the panel, as upon
cross-examination, without infringing upon his right to decline to answer
particular questions on the ground that his answers would incriminate
him. 20  (Emphasis added.)
But what constitutes self-incrimination? While under existing policy
an attorney may invoke the privilege if his answer might lead to criminal
prosecution, may he invoke it if his answer would be grounds for dis-
barment? TheQklahoma rule says he may, if he "shall personally state
that he declines to answer any particular question on the grounds that
his answer might ... show him guilty of an act or offense that would
15. In re Nevius, 159 Ohio St. 341, 112 N.E.2d 380 (1953); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St.
492, 670, 89 N.E. 39, 89 (1909); State ex rel. Joseph v. Crossland, 152 Ohio St. 199, 201,
88 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1949); Annot., 105 A.L.R. 984 (1936).
16. In ro Hawke, 63 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); Schwartz v. State, 18 Ohio
App. 373 (1924); Io-re Lundy, 8 Ohio C.C. Dec. 111 (1897).
17. 28 OHio BAR 469, 470 (1955).
18. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 257 (1957). Since the writing of this
article, the Supreme Court has heard this case a second time. The majority opinion suggests
that for the purpose of invoking the privilege against self-incrimination the evidentiary rules
in-disbarment proceedings are analogous to those in civil cases. Konigsberg v. State Bar of
Cal., 29 U.S.L. WEEK, 4341, 4344 (1961).
19. In re Vaughn, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922); see also In re Eaton, 14 IIl. 2d 338,
152 N.E.2d 850 (1958).
20. Memorandum from F. W. Gooding, member of the Board of Commissioners, to the
Board, May 9, 1957; see also OHIo Rav. CODE § 2317.07.
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be grounds for disbarment."'" The Ohio position has not yet been made
so clear 2
The Board's general policy, however, as far as it extends, is in accord
with the policy of the majority of states. At least two states, Florida
and Michigan, provide expressly in their rules that the accused attorney
has a duty "to present himself for cross-examination."2  New York and
California have gone even further and held that an attorney has an ab-
solute duty to make full disclosure to the court whose officer he is and
that failure to do so is itself grounds for disbarment regardless of any
possibility of self-incrimination.24
On the side of the minority, Utah and Idaho provide that an attorney
charged with misconduct "shall not be required to testify, but if he offers
himself as a witness at the hearing, he may be examined with respect to
all material matters . .. ",25 These latter rules conform to Ohio law
governing criminal proceedings: that an accused cannot be called for
cross-examination, but if he volunteers to testify, he cannot then invoke
the personal privilege against self-incrimination.26 No Ohio case has
been found which meets squarely the right of a party in a civil suit to
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when called for cross-
examination by his opponent.2  But within the framework of such Ohio
law as there is and the Board's working policy statement, it would ap-
21. OKLA. BAR ASS'N, REv. RULES, art. VII, pt I § 11.
22. Not every Ohio court before the adoption of amended Rule XXVII allowed the prose-
cutor to call respondent for cross-examination in a disciplinary proceeding. See In re Dom-
bey, 68 Ohio L Abs. 36,40 (C.P. 1954).
23. Micn. Sup. CT. RULES CONCERNiNG THE STATE BAR, rule 14, § 9; INTEGRATION
RULE OF FLA. BAR, art. XI, § 3.
24. In re Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672 (1960), apparently overruling In re Grae,
282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940) (refusal to testify in good faith not grounds for dis-
barment). [Since the writing of this article, the Supreme Court has affirmed the decision of
the New York Court of Appeals in Cohen v. Hurley, 29 U.S. WEEK 4367 (1961). The
court said: "In this regard all that New York has in effect held is that petitioner, by resort to
a privilege against self-incrimination, can no more claim a right not to be disbarred for his
refusal to answer with respect to matters within the competence of the Court's supervisory
powers over members of the bar, than could a trustee claim a right not to be removed from
office for failure to render accounts which might incriminate him." Id. at 4368.]
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959), aff'd, 29
U.S.L WEEK 4341 (1961) (admission to the bar); RULES OF THE STATE BAR OF Wis.,
rule 10. But cf. In re Integration Rule of Fla. Bar, 103 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1956), where it was
said by the court: 'To hold that one's attempt to invoke the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment or refusal to answer questions that would tend to incriminate him would be prima fade
evidence that he is unfit to practice law would place an undue burden .... It seems to me
that a course like this is the only one consistent with our tradition of fair trial and equal pro-
tection." Id. at 878.
25. UTAH STATE BAR, REv. RULES OF DISCIPLINE, rule iv, § 42; IDAHO STATE BAR,
RULES GOVERNiNG CoNDucr OF ATms., rule 165.
26. But see State v. Hollos, 76 Ohio App. 521, 65 N.B.2d 144 (1944); Omo REV. CODE
§ 2945.43.
27. State ex rel. Simons v. Kiser, 98 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950 (dictum) (bastardy
proceeding); 42 OHo JuE. Witnesses § 48 (1936).
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pear that an attorney may invoke the privilege when called to testify by
the prosecutor in a disciplinary hearing but may not invoke the privilege
when cross-examined after testifying on his own behalf.
Moral Character
The supreme court and the Board have tended to apply the rules of
evidence for criminal proceedings on the issue of respondent's moral
character. For instance, in one case the court considered testimony of an.
attorney's claim to be a member of both political parties as proof of an.
aggravated offense.28 In another case, the court took into account testimo-
ny of an attorney's good reputation and modified a Board recommenda-
tion of suspension to an order of public reprimand.29 In both instances,
character was in issue as an evidentiary fact, and in a civil proceeding
would properly have been excluded.
Further, as the criminal code prescribes what acts constitute a crime,.
so Rule XXVII prescribes what acts constitute misconduct - violation
of the Code of Legal Ethics, of the oath for admission to practice, and
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude."0 In disciplinary
proceedings since the adoption of Rule XXVII the court has been care-
ful to sustain only those charges which proved specific acts of misconduct.
In Cleveland Bar Association v. Wilkerson,"' the court refused to con-
sider evidence which was not sufficient to sustain a specific charge. In
Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant,2 decided before the Code of Ethics.
was included in the definition of misconduct, the opinion went to some
lengths to show at least a technical violation of a statute regulating pro-
bate procedure."3 The grounds for initiating the charges against respond-
ent were that he had represented two clients with opposing interests; the
rationale for sustaining the charges was that in doing so he had violated
the statute. Both cases indicate a reluctance by the Ohio Supreme Court-
to discipline an attorney on the basis of bad character alone, unsupportect
by a specific charge. 4
28. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 34, 151 N.E.2d 17, 29 (1958).
(claim made during judge's campaign for city prosecutor).
29. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Vann, 168 Ohio St. 481, 155 N.E.2d 922 (1959).
30. OHIo Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 5.
31. 168 Ohio St. 478, 156 N.E.2d 136 (1959).
32. 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
33. OHio REV. CODE § 2113.36.
34. An Illinois case illustrates how far a court will go in finding a specific charge for mis--
conduct before imposing discipline. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 288 Ill. 615,.
124 N.E. 340 (1919). Eleven counts were charged against an attorney, the last stating that
his "general reputation for truth, veracity, fair dealing and professional honesty as a lawyer-
in the City of Chicago is bad." The referee, who heard the testimony, found there was suf-
ficient evidence to support only the eleventh charge and recommended disbarment. The
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In In re Lieberman, however, the court stated broadly that "the moral
character of an attorney is at all times to be scrutinized . . . and such
moral character is necessarily at issue in a disbarment proceeding."35
Under the facts of that case the court's statement goes no further than
to authorize admission of a prior disciplinary order as probative evidence
of an attorney's character.
Rule XXVII implicitly provides for admitting into evidence a record
of a prior suspension or public reprimand and requires that it be weighed
heavily in determining the degree of discipline in the subsequent proceed-
ing."8  Further, the new rule empowers the Board "to entertain and in-
quire into . . . practices of any attorney . . . or judge which tend to
defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal
profession into disrepute."37 The court's dictum in the Lieberman case and
the broad investigative power of the Board granted by the new rule
could be reasonably construed to mean that bad character, while not suf-
ficient in itself to sustain suspension or disbarment, is to be considered as
an auxiliary issue in disciplinary proceedings. How then may the ad-
versary parties present character testimony for the Board's scrutiny?
In criminal cases, the prosecutor may introduce testimony as to the
character of the defendant only if the latter places his character in issue'
In civil cases neither party may introduce testimony as to his own or his
adversary's character unless the issue is joined in the pleadings39 And
it has been only in slander and malicious prosecution cases that the Ohio
Supreme Court has permitted character to be put in issue by the pleadings.
The exception in slander cases appears to have been extended to dis-
ciplinary proceedings where informal pleadings are allowed"0 and where
the supreme court has declared that character is "necessarily at issue."
However, the outer limits of the exception - which admits character
testimony as substantive evidence in a civil action - have not been de-
fined. There has yet been no determination by the supreme court whether
Supreme Court of Illinois found sufficient evidence to support the first four specific counts
and affirmed the order. As to the eleventh count the court said:
"While such a charge is not of itself sufficiently specific to comply with said rule so aS to
form a basis for disbarment, yet, as one of the qualifications of an attorney at law is that he
be of good moral character, it is competent to consider his general reputation for truth, honesty,
fair dealing, and ethical practices in connection with specific charges filed against him." Id.
at 623, 124 N.E. at 343.
35. In re Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 41, 125 NE.2d 328, 331 (1955).
36. Omo Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 7.
37. Id. 5 1 (b).
38. State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N.E.2d 1 (1941). Of course, a prosecutor
may introduce evidence as to general reputation for truth and veracity to impeach a defendant
who takes the witness stand.
39. Sloneker v. Van Ausdali, 106 Ohio St. 320, 140 NE. 121 (1922), overruling Blakeslee
v. Hughes, 50 Ohio St. 490 (1893); ci. Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E. 360
(1921).
40. OHIo SuP. CT. R. XXVII § 8.
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a prosecutor may call character witnesses before respondent has placed
his character in issue, whether these witnesses may offer their personal
opinion of respondent's character and whether they may testify in regard
to specific misconduct not charged in the complaint.
Before these outer limits are defined it should be remembered: first,
that the reason for the general rule against admitting character testimony
is to protect civil trials from degenerating into "a contest between neigh-
borhood factions;"'" and, second, that the reasons for the rule's exception
to plaintiffs in slander cases is "because an unfavorable outcome affects
his character to a degree equivalent to a punishment."42  In disciplinary
proceedings, where the outcome may be "equivalent to a punishment"
for the respondent-attorney, it is well to set the outer limits as they have
been set in criminal actions and allow character testimony in evidence
only at the option of the attorney whose reputation is at stake.
Conviction of a Crime
Section 5 of Rule XXVII includes in its definition of misconduct
"commission or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." In
1943, an Ohio court of appeals, in construing similar language in the
state disbarment statute,43 reasoned that the legislature must have had a
particular reason for including both "conviction" and "commission" as
grounds for disbarment.44 This observation led the court to conclude
that where misconduct is predicated upon commission of a crime alone, a
full fledged hearing into the commission is in order, but where there has
been a conviction
and the statute violated involves an act of moral turpitude .... an allega-
tion of a conviction of a violation of that statute is a sufficient compli-
ance with the provision which requires the charge to state "distinctly the
grounds of complaint."45
Apparently applying this same reasoning to the new rule, the relator in
Cincinnati Bar Association v. Massengale filed a complaint in which the
first ground simply alleged conviction of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude." The supreme court delivered a sharp rebuke to the respondent
for his attempt to go behind the judgment of conviction and show his
innocence:
41. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 921 (3d ed. 1940).
42. I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 66 (3d ed. 1940).
43. OHIO REV. CODE § 4705.02 ("misconduct or unprofessional conduct in office involv-
ing moral turpitude, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude" grounds for disd-
pline).
44. In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 162, 57 NXE.2d 932, 938-39 (1943).
45. Id. at 162, 57 N.E.2d 939.
46. 171 Ohio St. 442 (1961).
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Respondenes endeavor to show that he was wrongly convicted of the
wire-tapping charge was hardly permissible.4 7
Ohio law provides that a record of conviction of a felony or statutory
misdemeanor involving crimen falsi introduced to impeach a witness can-
not be explained or justified to rehabilitate the witness.4" The judgment
must forever stand, under the well-known and long established rule of
res adjudicata ... if the conviction should be followed by a pardon,
that could likewise be shown. But the conviction itself cannot thereafter
be questioned... 
Under this long standing rule and in view of the dictum in the
Massengale case, Ohio appears to be in line with those states which hold
that a judgment of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is
conclusive in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding." At least two states
hold that such conviction is not conclusive as to misconduct on which
the attorney is sought to be suspended or disbarred but is only prima
fade evidence."1
If a judgment of conviction is conclusive proof of misconduct, should
not a verdict of acquittal or judgment of reversal be equally conclusive?
47. Id. at 444. See also Butler County Bar Ass'n v. Schaefer, 172 Ohio St. 165 (1961),
where the Board's refusal to allow respondent to explain the extenuating circumstances of a plea
of guilty to an indictment of offering a false prescription for a narcotic drug was upheld by
the supreme court.
48. Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922); but cf. State v. Snyder, 157
Ohio St. 15, 104 N.E.2d 169 (1952) (prosecution for neglect following divorce judgment).
The court held it was "dearly prejudicial error" for the trial court to refuse to permit the ac-
cused to present evidence tending to show he was not the father of the children allegedly being
neglected.
For a reverse application of the rule, see In re Linthkfum, 32 OHIO L. REP. 254 (Ct. App.
1930). Attorney claimed that judgment of conviction and prison sentence suspended on
condition that he refrain from practicing law was res judicata and, therefore, a bar to subse-
quent disciplinary proceeding.
49. Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 487, 140 N.E. 364, 366 (1922).
50. In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936); In re Eaton, 14 II. 2d 338, 152
N.E.2d 850 (1958); In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946); see WAsH.
Sup. CT. RULES FOR DIscIPLMN OF ArS., rule 10 (i).
51. State v. O'Leary, 20 Wis. 70, 241 N.W. 621 (1932); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Caw-
thorn, 223 La. 884, 67 So. 2d 165 (1953) (rebuttable presumption only).
The rule that a judgment of conviction is conclusive for the purposes of the disbarment
proceeding has led to some odd results. For instance, an Illinois attorney was convicted of
federal income tax evasion and in a separate hearing was suspended from the bar of the federal
district court. In the subsequent state proceeding, where under Illinois law conviction of such
a crime is conclusive proof of unfitness to practice law, the attorney charged was not permitted
to explain the mitigating circumstances of the offense. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
avoided its own restrictive rule by turning to the record of the federal disciplinary hearing.
The disbarment order entered by the lower state court was modified to three years suspension.
In re Teitelbaum, 13 II. 2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958).
In New York, where the state statute provides for automatic disbarment upon a felony
conviction, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW 5 90(4), an attorney so disbarred received a presidential
pardon years later. The Court of Appeals said that the pardon removed the impediment of
the conclusive record and opened "the range of scrutiny... as wide as it was at the common
law." In re Kaufman, 245 N.Y. 423, 428, 157 N.E. 730, 732 (1927); but see In re Ginsberg,
1 N.Y.2d 144, 148, 134 N.E.2d 193, 195 (1956) (dissent).
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The courts have not so held. 2 In Ohio, where disciplinary proceedings
are civil in nature and require only a preponderance of the evidence, the
analogy may be a fallacious one. But the analogy, unsound as it may
be, suggests a deeper fallacy, one of overemphasizing the technical con-
viction as opposed to the facts which sustained such conviction." 3
Another aspect of the problem involves the question of moral turpi-
tude for disbarment purposes. In Stark County Bar Association v. Beyog-
lides,5 some members of the supreme court were doubtful as "to whether
conviction of the offense of selling intoxicants to a minor shows moral
turpitude" where the statute covering such sales does not require scienter
to sustain a conviction.55 In a case decided before adoption of the rule,
an Ohio court of appeals held that "whether a crime involves moral turpi-
tude or not, is sometimes a question of law and sometimes a question
of fact."56  But if moral turpitude is a question of fact, then requiring
the record of a prior conviction to stand as conclusive is tantamount to
denying the attorney a reasonable defense. As an Ohio court of appeals
has said:
Notwithstanding his plea of guilty, he had a perfect right, in a dis-
barment proceeding, to establish, if he could, that he did not know
that there was any such law and, if he succeeded in establishing that fact,
there was no moral turpitude in his act which would make him subject
to disbarment for the violation of such law. 57
52. In re Abrahms, 36 Ohio App. 384, 173 N.E. 312 (1930); lo re Doe, 95 F.2d 386 (2d
Cir. 1938). At least one court has held that such a verdict of acquittal or judgment of rever-
sal was not even admissible as evidence for the defense. In re O'Brien, 95 Vt. 167, 113 Ad.
527 (1921).
53. In Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883), the Supreme Court of the United States said
in regard to criminal convictions determining the outcome of disciplinary actions "that it is
not the technical conviction which is required, but a fair effort on the part of the prosecutor
to bring the offender to justice." Id. at 278.
Mr. Justice Bradley, writing the majority opinion, listed the common-law reasons why
courts (or boards) should wait for a conviction before initiating disciplinary proceedings:
1) The court should be cautious of putting a party into a situation where, by answering,
he might furnish a case against himself on an indictment to be afterwards preferred.
2) The court should hesitate to take summary action against an offender which might
remove the inducements the injured party would otherwise have for proceeding against him
and thus interfere with the course of justice.
3) A jury is the most suitable tribunal for passing upon a question of fact depending on
conflicting evidence. Id. at 277-78.
The general rule that a court will not inquire into the conduct of an attorney, not con-
nected with his status as an attorney, until the matter has been determined by a criminal pro-
ceeding, is said to be one of propriety, not of power. Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1111 (1934); In re
Dellenbaugh, 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 325 (1899).
54. 169 Ohio St. 201, 158 N.E.2d 361 (1959).
55. Id. at 202, 158 N.E.2d at 362. In State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158 N.E.2d 525
(1959), the court held that for a conviction under OHIo REV. CODE § 4301.22(B) proof of
scienter is not required.
56. In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 158 N.E.2d 932, 937 (1943).
57. In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 106, 54 N.E.2d 803, 808 (1943) (concurring opinion).
Burch had been convicted of a violation of the federal foreign agents registration act. The
majority opinion maintained that to warrant disbarment "the evidence must show . . . that
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The Ohio rule which forbids the explanation or contradiction of a
record of a criminal conviction introduced to impeach the character of a
witness is not appropriate to disciplinary proceedings. As the conviction
is itself grounds for discipline, there is less likelihood of involvement with
remote collateral matters. Further, there are too many situations which
demand an exception to the rule. More important than the technical
conviction itself are the facts which support the conviction. If the
respondent has the opportunity to explain these facts, he has had a fair
hearing. Thus, where certain facts are not explained by the conviction
itself, it may be well to allow in evidence the entire record of the
criminal trial.5 s
Records of Prior Civil Proceedings
In the past, Ohio courts have sometimes followed the practice of ad-
mitting records of prior civil proceedings in a subsequent disbarment
proceeding.59 In an Ohio federal case, an attorney was disbarred solely
on the basis of his perjured testimony transcribed in a previous case.6" In
a single hearing, the court issued an order of contempt and a rule to
show cause why the respondent should not be removed from the rolls.
Before the adoption of Rule XXVII, the state courts followed a
similar procedure. The Ohio Supreme Court held that where
the evidence sustains both the charges of contempt and of disbarment,
the court may adjudge the respondent guilty of contempt . .. and in
the same proceeding enter an order of cancellation of the certificate of
such attorney.6'
Rule XXVII, however, discontinues this practice by giving the board of
commissioners exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings," and
by requiring that the rules of evidence be applied.
his misfeasance or malfeasance must have been in his capacity as an attorney." Id. at 104, 54
N.E.2d at 807. Cf. State v. Metcalfe, 204 Iowa 123, 214 N.W. 874 (1927) (assault with in-
tent to inflict bodily injury not moral turpitude); contra, In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65
NE.2d 202 (1946).
In California conviction of a felony results in automatic disbarment. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6102. But the state supreme court rules allow the attorney so convicted to show cause
in "law or in fact why a final order of disbarment should not be made." CAL. Sup. CT. IL
FOR DISCIPLiNARY PROC. ON CONVICTION OF CRIME (a). The attorney's entry may show
either that the circumstances of the commission of the crime did not involve moral turpitude
or any facts that would mitigate the extent of discipline.
58. For cases which have allowed in evidence the record of a prior criminal trial, see Louisi-
ana State Bar Ass'n v. Sackett, 234 La. 762, 770, 101 So. 2d 661, 663 (1958); State v. Met-
calfe, 204 Iowa 123, 127, 214 N.W. 874, 875 (1927).
59. State ex rtel. Guille v. Chapman, 11 Ohio 367, 369 (1842); In re Neff, 34 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 261, 266 (1912).
60. In re Ulmer, 11 OHIo L. REP. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
61. State ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 161 N.E. 792 (1928); see also State
ex rel. Levy v. Savord, 143 Ohio St. 451, 55 NXE.2d 735 (1944).
62. OHIo Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 4.
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Where a criminal proceeding follows a civil proceeding and is based
on the same charges, the rule in Ohio is that neither the judgment record
nor the transcript of testimony from the first suit is admissible.63 One of
the reasons for the rule is that in the first case the jury may be con-
vinced by a preponderance of the evidence whereas in the second it must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.64
An Ohio court of appeals has adopted the same policy in a state dis-
barment proceeding to exclude testimony taken in a federal court con-
tempt hearing."5 The findings of the referee and the order of the dis-
trict judge should not have been admitted, the court said, because a
judgment in a civil suit "is not predicated upon that degree of proof
which is required in the instant proceedings where a higher degree of
proof is required."" Since the proof is now held to be the same for
disciplinary proceedings as for ordinary civil proceedings, this basis for
excluding transcripts of record is no longer valid. There is, however,
the general rule that unless the witness is unavailable in the second
proceeding, his transcript of testimony in the first is hearsay and, there-
fore, inadmissible. 7
In Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant,6" disciplinary proceedings
were brought against respondent after a probate judge found in a formal
contempt hearing that the attorney had committed a fraud on the court.
On appeal to the court of appeals the contempt order was modified and
on appeal to the supreme court the original order was affirmed."
At the outset of the disciplinary proceedings counsel for relator made
a motion that both parties submit all the testimony of the prior con-
tempt hearing along with briefs and that the panel render judgment
thereon."0 The panel denied the motion on the grounds that respondent
was entitled to a trial de novo and presumably because the transcript of
testimony was hearsay.7 The panel did, however, agree to take judicial
notice of the opinions by the court of appeals and the supreme court.72
63. Gee v. State, 10 Ohio St. 485 (1899); State v. Schwartz, 137 Ohio St. 371, 30 N.E.2d
551 (1940).
64. State v. Schwartz, note 63 supra, at 375, 30 N.E.2d at 552.
65. In re Hawke, 63 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945).
66. Id. at 556.
67. Annot., 161 A.L.R. 898 (1946). For a criticism of the rule in Ohio, see Note, Use of
Reported Testimony in Subsequent Cases, 11 WEsT. RiES. L. REv. 471 (1960).
68. 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958) (suspension pro-
ceedings).
69. In re Estate of Wright, 123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954), modified, 165 Ohio St.
15, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956).
70. Record, vol. 1, p. 24, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 329, 148 N.E.2d
493 (1958).
71. See OHIo REv. CODE § 2317.06 (civil), § 2945A9 (criminal).
72. Record, vol. 1, note 70 supra, at pp. 34, 36. The chairman of the hearing panel com-
mented: "And that which we take judicial notice of, of course, is one thing; but otherwise I
don't think we should be influenced any by the decisions of the lower court." Id. at p. 36.
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Included in the supreme court opinion was a detailed account of the find-
ings of fact by the probate court.73 Later, on cross-examination of the
respondent-witness, relator moved that respondent's entire testimony in
the prior contempt hearing be introduced for the purpose of impeach-
ment.' The motion was granted. Thus, what appeared in the begin-
ning to be a strict ruling on admissibility in the end did not seriously
affect relator's manner of presenting the evidence.75
Adherence to the technical rules of evidence allowed the hearing
panel and the board to take judicial notice of the findings of fact of the
probate court through the published opinion of the supreme court, but
required them to exclude the transcript of testimony of the prior proceed-
ings. The result was exactly opposite to established procedures for dis-
barment actions in other jurisdictions where the transcript of testimony
of a prior civil suit is admissible but not the findings of fact.7" The justi-
fication for this alternative procedure is that due process is preserved if
the witness whose recorded testimony is later admitted was subject to
cross-examination and impeachment in the first proceeding by the at-
torney charged or his counsel."
The rules of the Kentucky Court of Appeals specifically provide for
admitting a certified transcript of testimony from a prior proceeding if the
disciplinary case involves "the same charge or any charge growing out of
matters connected therewith." 8  As an additional safeguard, the rules
authorize either party to the disciplinary action to recall any witness, if
available, for further examination. 9 These restrictions on the admissi-
73. In re Estate of Wright. 165 Ohio St. 15, 19-25, 133 N.E.2d 350, 353-57 (1956).
74. Record, vol. 1, note 70 supra, at 403. Counsel for relator's method of getting some 150
pages of testimony from the contempt proceeding into the record was on the grounds of prior
inconsistent statement (or lack of statement). Respondent testifying in his own behalf was
discovered to have added one fact which he allegedly had never mentioned in testifying at the
prior hearing. The entire record of respondent's former testimony was admitted to prove he
had never before stated such fact.
75. On appeal, relator referred extensively in his brief to the findings of fact set forth in
In re Estate of Wright 123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Cr. App. 1954). Brief for Relator, pp. 21-7,
Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 329, 148 N.E.2d 493 (1958).
76. In re Santosuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105 (1945); In re Integration Rule of Fla.
Bar, 103 So. 2d 873, 878 (Fla. 1956); In re Falzone, 220 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949);
Anno., 161 A.L.R. 898 (1946); contra, People ex rel. Bar Ass'n v. Amos, 246 Ill. 299, 92
N.E. 857 (1910); but cf. In re Feldman, 373 Ill. 563, 566, 27 NX.E.2d 471, 473 (1940).
77. In re Santosuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 494-95, 62 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1945). The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court explained: 'The necessity for the preservation of the integrity of the
courts and the safety of the public rises above the strictly technical rules of evidence that govern
such adversary proceedings between the parties."
The Massachusetts rule distinguishes prior civil proceedings from prior criminal proceed-
ings: the transcript of prior civil or contempt proceedings may be admitted, but the findings
of fact from such proceedings may not be admitted; the transcripts of prior criminal proceed-
ings may not be admitted but the fact of criminal conviction may be admitted. Compare In re
Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946).
78. Ky. CT. OF App. RULES, DIsCIPLINARY PROC., 5 3.380.
79. Ibid.
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bility of a transcript of testimony from a prior proceeding prudently avoid
the objection that
... the records from the case[s] ... not only were introduced against
[the attorney], who was neither a party nor a counsel in either, but were
the sole evidence to produce the direct case against him.80
There is needed in Ohio a more flexible approach to the problem of
admissibility of a prior transcript in a disbarment proceeding. For in-
stance, Rule XXVII requires the admission of a prior order of suspension
or public reprimand, but is silent concerning an order of private repri-
mand.8 Even when a charge has been dismissed, the transcript of
the proceedings may be pertinent to a subsequent case involving the same
party.' More important than adhering to the technical rules of evidence
in this area is obtaining the facts which aid in revealing an attorney's
total pattern of misconduct. The Supreme Court of California has
pointed it up clearly:
The prior record not only tends to prove facts in issue, but gives
substantial aid in determining the degree of discipline to be ad-
ministered.83
The same policy should apply to civil proceedings outside the juris-
diction of the Board. The issue should not be whether a contempt
order or even a criminal conviction is res judicata for the subsequent
disciplinary proceedings. Rather the issue should be what testimony is
relevant to the charges now being heard and whether it is fair to the
attorney charged to admit it as evidence. In the area of records of prior
proceedings, it is necessary to depart from the rules of evidence.
REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Opinion Testimony
In the first reinstatment hearing under the new rule, petitioner
paraded twenty-nine witnesses before the panel. On direct examination
they were asked:
Now do you have an opinion as to whether or not petitioner has the
moral qualifications which are required of persons applying for admis-
sion to the bar?
or:
Do you know of anything that petitioner has done since his suspension
that would not entitle him to reinstatement?
80. Kingsley v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 325 (1949) (dissent).
81. OHIO Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 7.
82. See OKLA. BAR Ass'N REV. RULEs, art. vii, Pt. 1, § 21; BY-LAws UNDER INTEGRATED
RULE OF FLA. BAR, art xi, § 23.1.
83. Resner v. State Bar of Cal., 53 Cal. 2d 605, 349 P.2d 67 (1960).
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All of the witnesses at the first hearing answered these questions in a
manner favorable to petitioner; a few testified as to facts upon which they
based their opinion.8 4
In the second hearing, two months later, the local bar association
called eleven witnesses before the panel who testified generally in oppo-
sition to the reinstatement application. Counsel for the committee op-
posing the reinstatement attempted to put the same question concerning
the moral qualifications of the petitioner, but this time objection to it was
sustained.8" From that point on, the panel restricted counsel to questions
relating only to the petitioner's general reputation as an attorney.
Other jurisdictions not only allow opinion testimony in reinstate-
ment proceedings but prescribe it as the generally accepted method of
proving character rehabilitation. 6 Ohio courts in the past have also ad-
mitted opinion testimony in reinstatement proceedings.87 But these latter
cases were heard before the adoption of the requirement that "all rules
of evidence shall be observed in the conduct of all hearings."
At one time, the Ohio rules of evidence allowed opinion testimony
derived from personal acquaintance and excluded testimony as to the
reputation of a man's character. The reasons for this earlier rule were
based on the policy that
... those who know the character of the man, his moral habits, are by
law competent to give their opinion ... , while those who know noth-
ing but the witness' reputation, of what is generally said of him, are not
competent.... A man's character must be true, his reputation may be
false.88
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed its rule in 1851 and adopted the rule,
instead, that reputation is the orthodox and exclusive mode of proof.8"
This rule has been consistently applied ever since." The basis of the
84. Record, vol. 1, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546 (1961) (reinstatement
proceeding).
85. Record, vol. 2, note 84 supra, p. 484 (ruling on basis of 21 OHIo JUR. 2D Evidence §
225 (1956)).
86. In re Daniel, 315 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1957); Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So.
791 (1933) (estimations of witnesses intimately acquainted admissible); Feinstein v. State
Bar of Cal., 39 Cal. 2d 541, 248 P.2d 3 (1952) (letters of recommendation admissible, but
not conclusive). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said in In re Daniel: "It is a well recognized
rule of law that the proper method and manner of establishing the character trustworthiness
of one seeking readmission to the Bar is by presentation of recommendations and statements
of those who are in a position to know and judge the petitioner." 315 P.2d at 791.
87. In re Joseph, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 268, 69, 140 N.E.2d 72 (C.P. 1956); In re Rothenberg,
31 Ohio L. Abs. 370, 374 (Ct. App. 1940).
88. Seely v. Blair, Wright 358 (1834); accord, Wilson v. Runnyon, Wright 651 (1834).
89. Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851).
90. French v. Millard, 2 Ohio St. 45 (1853); Craig v. State, 5 Ohio St. 605 (1854); Hillis
v. Wylie, 26 Ohio St. 574 (1875); Cowen v. Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878). Regarding
the rule that reputation testimony is the exclusive mode of proving character Wigmore com-
ments: 'The Anglo-American rules of evidence have occasionally taken some curious twist-
ings in the course of their development but they have never done anything so curious in the
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rule is to prevent extensive testimony on the collateral issues of a witness'
character. For this reason it has not always been applied when the char-
acter of one of the parties to the suit is directly in issue.
In homicide cases, for instance, the Ohio Supreme Court has allowed
the defense to offer opinion testimony regarding the character of the
accused as it relates to the probability of his guilt. At first only a nega-
tive description that the prisoner had led nothing but a peaceful and
quiet existence was permitted.9 Later, positive testimony by those "most
intimate" with him was allowed. 2
The homicide cases are an exception to the rule, tolerated perhaps
because a man's life is in the balance.93 Yet, in the homicide cases the
character of the accused is relevant only as it tends to demonstrate the
probability of his conduct on a specified occasion. In reinstatement cases,
the character of the petitioner is the issue. In one regard, then, there is
even a stronger reason for allowing such testimony in reinstatement pro-
ceedings.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence provide:
When a person's character or a trait of his character is in issue, it
may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, evidence of reputa-
tion, or evidence of specific instances of the person's conduct.9 '
As the Ohio Supreme Court has not expressly precluded the use of
opinion testimony when a man's character is the sole issue, application of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence to reinstatement proceedings would not
be inconsistent with Rule XXVII's evidence requirements. Nor is there
any inconsistency in excluding opinion testimony in disciplinary proceed-
ings and admitting it in reinstatement proceedings. In the former, char-
acter may be in issue as an evidentiary fact, giving support to specific
charges. In the latter, character is the ultimate issue which must be
tested from the outset of the proceeding.
As the supreme court itself declared in restating the rule allowing
opinion testimony in homicide cases:
It may easily happen that a defendant could not prove general good
reputation for peace and quiet, and yet his intimate friends, and mem-
way of shutting out evidential light as when they decided to exclude the person who knows as
much as humanly can be known about the character of another, and have still admitted the
secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip we term 'reputation."' 7
WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940).
91. Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114, 117 (1860).
92. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 53, 82 N.E. 969, 971 (1907).
93. No Ohio opinions were found which allowed opinion testimony on behalf of the char-
acter of an accused in non-homicide cases. Reputation testimony is admissible on charges of
all grades of homicide. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 56 (3d ed. 1940).
94. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 46.
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bers of his immediate family might testify in his behalf as to his good
character.95
Once suspended and publicly reprimanded, an attorney may never be
able to overcome a bad reputation. He may, however, have genuinely
rehabilitated himself. How else can he prove rehabilitation except by
calling witnesses who know him by his character and not by his reputa-
tion?
The Problem of Relevancy
At the outset of the first reinstatement hearina under Rule XXVII,
opposing counsel were at odds in regard to the admissibility of evidence
of petitioner's original misconduct. Counsel for petitioner maintained
that the evidence should be limited to conduct subsequent to the suspension:
He has either rehabilitated himself satisfactorily since the date of
suspension to the present time or he has not.96
Counsel for the committee opposing the reinstatement, admitting that
there was no evidence available showing that petitioner had done any-
thing wrong during his two years of suspension, sharply protested:
It is the position of our committee that if that should be the guide,
then there is no purpose; we might as well retireY
7
The issue turned out to be a critical one. One witness later called
by counsel opposing the application stated he would favor petitioner's
reinstatement considering the situation since the date of suspension, but
that he would not favor it considering petitioner's entire record and over-
all reputation which was "not good."9" As to admissibility of evidence
relating to the period before suspension, the panel made the following
ruling: (1) that since the relevant issue was rehabilitation, the com-
mittee could not offer evidence on direct examination of petitioner's
original misconduct; (2) but that since rehabilitation had to start some-
where, opposing counsel could cross-examine petitioner's character wit-
nesses as to their knowledge of the grounds for petitioner's prior suspen-
sion insofar as it related to present opinion of character.99
Clearly, an attorney seeking reinstatement is not in the same position
as the attorney seeking admission for the first time."°  Rule XXVII
imposes on the attorney applying for reinstatement the burden of estab-
95. Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 239, 163 N.E. 28, 31 (1928).
96. Record, vol. 1, pp. 90, 91, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546 (1961)
(reinstatement proceeding).
97. Id. at p. 20.
98. Record, voL2, note 96 supra, at p. 518.
99. Record, vol. 1, note 96 supra, at pp. 102, 103, 154.
100. In re King, 54 Ohio St. 415, 417, 43 N. 686, 687 (1896).
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lishing rehabilitation by "'clear and convincing evidence."' 01 Courts of a
number of other jurisdictions require an attorney seeking reinstatement
to overcome a presumption of lack of moral character, a presumption
which is conclusive at the time of disbarment or suspension and which is
rebuttable at the time of application for reinstatement. 2 Is not the re-
quirement of "establishing by clear and convincing evidence" substan-
tially equivalent to the requirement of overcoming such a presumption?
If there is a presumption of lack of moral character, then a panel en-
tertaining a petition for reinstatement should have some knowledge of
the facts underlying the presumption. Rule XXVII so provides.' The
problem, therefore, does not involve the withholding of certain facts from
the panel, as if from a jury, but rather relates to the manner in which
the hearing is to be conducted. How much evidence relating to the
period prior to the suspension is admissible; how much effect should
such evidence have upon the outcome of the hearing? The opposing
views expressed by counsel in the first reinstatement hearing focus on
situations: (1) where testimony of prior misconduct is adduced by oppos-
ing counsel on direct examination of his own witnesses; (2) where lead-
ing questions on cross-examination of petitioner expose prior misconduct;
(3) where leading questions on cross-examination of petitioner's char-
acter witnesses expose such misconduct.
Under the panel's ruling, evidence in the first situation is inadmissi-
ble. To avoid the second situation in which the petitioner exposes him-
self to wide-open cross examination, he should not testify to facts prior
to suspension.' In the third situation the panel's ruling in accordance
with the general rule of evidence allows counsel cross-examining a
character witness to uncover facts of past history in order to test the basis
of the witness' present opinion regarding the petitioner." 5
If counsel for petitioner is careful, he may keep these unwelcome facts
to a minimum. He must confine the petitioner's testimony on direct
101. OHIO SuP. CT. R.XXVII § 22(d).
102. In re Keenan, 313 Mass. 186 47 N.E.2d 12, 32 (1945); Maggart v. State Bar of
Cal., 29 Cal. 2d 439, 175 P.2d 505 (1946); see MICH. SUP. CT. RULis CONCERNING THE
STATE BAR, rule 14 S 20 (eligibility for reinstatement considered in light of past misconduct).
103. OHIO Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 22 (a).
104. See Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877) (testimony as to bad reputation of wit-
ness prior to time he entered prison two years before admissible).
105. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Comment, 15 MINN L. REV. 240(1930); but cf. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 55-56, 82 NE. 969, 972 (1907).
106. Among the objections made to character testimony in the form of personal opinion is
that the witness giving the opinion is usurping the function of the jury which is to decide the
ultimate issue. Ladd, Techniques of Character, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498, 513 (1939). At the
reinstatement hearing counsel for petitioner asked a number of witnesses: "In your opinion
does the petitioner have the moral qualifications to warrant his reinstatement?" Record, vol.
1, pp. 90, 91, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546 (1961). Objection to the
question in this form was eventually sustained. Record, vol. 2, supra at 509.
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examination to facts subsequent to the date of suspension. He must
prepare his character witnesses so that they will be acquainted with the
details of petitioner's prior misconduct, ready to parry questions on this
subject on cross-examination and willing to reassert their conviction in
petitioner's moral qualifications as an attorney despite what has gone
before.1"' In this way, he may not only avoid the danger that petitioner's
own witnesses will turn against him but he may also prevent opposing
counsel from probing into collateral issues which may undermine both
the petitioner's character witnesses and his case. At least under the panel
ruling counsel for petitioner has the opportunity to de-emphasize prior
misconduct and restrict the issue within reasonable limits to rehabilitation
subsequent to the order of suspension.
Far from approving the panel's ruling on relevant testimony, how-
ever, the supreme court referred to petitioner's course of "recurring con-
duct in his professional activities which disqualifies him from again"
resuming the practice of law.' The court's comment suggests that the
entire history of a reinstatement applicant is open to re-examination and
subject to challenge in the reinstatement hearing. But as the court gave
no further explanation for its comment, it is reasonable to expect that
future opposing counsel will again argue the relevancy of issues, and
that a future panel will again make a ruling thereon.
In support of a ruling restricting the issue to rehabilitation there are
the arguments: (1) that it would be impractical to hear again evidence
which was or should have been presented at the original disciplinary
proceeding, and that it is unfair to require an attorney once disciplined to
account for his misconduct a second time;.. 8 (2) that if evidence of prior
misconduct be admissible, no petitioner in the face of such evidence could
overcome the presumption of lack of moral character which also stands
against him." 9
In opposition to a restrictive ruling, there are the arguments: (1)
that consideration should be given to the question, not whether peti-
tioner has been adequately punished, but whether his reinstatement would
serve the best interests of the public and the bar;... (2) that Rule XXVII
requires petitioner to show in addition to rehabilitation his possession of
"all the moral qualifications which would have been a requirement of
107. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546, 549 (1961). Note that the court
may have rendered its decision with an eye to OHIo Sup. CT. R. XXVII 5 7 (suspension fol-
lowed by subsequent misconduct justifies permanent disbarment). Respondent had been
disbarred for six months, eighteen years before the reinstatement proceedings.
108. Record, vol. 1, p. 27, Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, note 96 supra.
109. Roth v. State Bar of Cal., 40 Cal. 2d 307, 318, 253 P.2d 969, 974 (1953) (dissent).
110. Brief for Appellant, p. 10, Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, note 96 supra.
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an applicant for admission to the Bar of Ohio at the time of his original
admission.""'
In general, Ohio courts before the adoption of Rule XXVII had
followed the second approach," 2 as have the courts of other jurisdic-
tions."' In California, the procedure is not to reconsider evidence taken
in the prior disciplinary proceedings when such evidence is presented by
the petitioner,"4 but to give weight to such evidence when it is offered
by opposing counsel in the reinstatement proceeding." 5
But these pre-Rule XXVII Ohio cases and out-of-state cases involved
attorneys who had been disbarred, not suspended. Under the new rule
an attorney who has been disbarred may never again apply for reinstate-
ment."' A question of signal importance is therefore presented: Is
suspension under Rule XXVII equivalent to the form of disbarment
provided for by the old statute so that Ohio cases decided prior to the
rule still apply? Or does suspension merely signify a temporary lapse in
an attorney's privilege to practice law, leaving him the opportunity to
demonstrate by his attitude and conduct subsequent to suspension that he
is entitled to reinstatement without having to explain again past mis-
deeds?".
As yet there has been no interpretation of the meaning of "suspen-
sion" under Rule XXVII. When such an interpretation has been made
by the supreme court, the Board will have a more definite guide for
determining what evidence is admissible and what is inadmissible in a
reinstatement proceeding. It is important in view of the original pur-
pose of the new rule that objective standards be established and that they
be uniformly applied." 8 A suspended attorney seeking reinstatement
in one hearing should be faced with the same requirements as an attorney
in another hearing. To achieve this end greater flexibility is needed in
111. Oio Sup. CT. R. XXVII § 22(d); accord, OiE. STATE BAR RuLEs OF PROC., DIS-
CIPLINARY, S 40; WASH. Sup. CT. RULES POR DIscIPLINE Op ATrYs., rule 46; But see S.C.
SuP. CT. R., DISCIPLINARY PROc., § 27 (only proof of rehabilitation required after suspen-
sion). Note that in all other aspects the South Carolina requirements for a reinstatement
petition are identical to those in OHIo SuP. CT. R. XXVII § 22.
112. In re Thatcher, 83 Ohio St. 246, 251, 93 N. 895, 896 (1910); In re Palmer, 15
Ohio C.C.R. 94, 102, 8 Ohio CC. Dec. 508, 513, 514, affd, 62 Ohio St. 643, 58 N.E. 1100
(1897).
In a 1956 case petitioner was denied reinstatement after opposing counsel's cross-examin-
ation revealed that he had perjured himself in the original disciplinary proceedings. In re
Joseph, 140 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
113. Annot., 70 A.LR. 2d 272, 275 (1960).
114. Maggart v. State Bar of Cal., 29 Cal. 2d 439, 443, 175 P.2d 505, 507 (1946); cf.
Feinstein v. State Bar of CaL, 39 Cal. 2d 541, 550, 248 P.2d 3, 6, 7 (1958).
115. Roth v. State Bar of Cal., note 109 sura, at 313, 253 P.2d at 972 (1958).
116. Omo Sup. Cr. R. XXVII 5 5, 21.
117. See State v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1959).
118. See Reply Brief for Ohio State Bar Association, Amicus Curiae, p. 16, In the Matter of
Amendment of Court Rule No. XXVII (Ohio 1956).
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providing for varying degrees of discipline, greater exactitude in setting
standards for reinstatement.
Provision for Indeterminate Suspension - Two Year Minimum
Flexibility in determining the degree of discipline to be imposed
upon an attorney found guilty of misconduct was provided for in the
Model Rules of Court for Disciplinary Proceedings approved by the
American Bar Association. The Model Rules expressly allow for discre-
tion in adjusting the minimum suspension period in accordance with the
seriousness of the offense."' Further, an effort was made to avoid the
general practice of readmitting automatically to the bar attorneys sus-
pended for fixed periods of time. The rules provide that
the entry of such order [of suspension] shall not be construed to imply
that the respondent will be entitled to the termination of his suspension
at the end of such minimum period.120
The practice of automatic readmission following suspension for a
fixed period was of even greater concern to the drafters of Ohio Supreme
Court Rule XXVII. 1 The flexible suspension provision in the Model
Rules was criticized by at least one of the Ohio drafters, on the ground
that "it could be construed by the offender as an invitation to apply for
reinstatement upon termination of the minimum period."' 2 Instead of such
a provision, Rule XXVII directs that suspension be for an indeterminate
period. The rule then goes on to state, somewhat ambiguously, that
no reinstatement shall be entertained within two years from the date of
the suspension order.'23
The first reinstatement case under Rule XXVII indicates that the
additional precautionary measures taken by the Ohio drafters may prove
ineffectual. In Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, petitioner appar-
ently construed the provision precluding application for reinstatement
before the lapse of two years as "an invitation to apply for reinstatement
upon termination of the minimum period." His petition was filed just
two years after he had been suspended.' 4
The Ohio rule's provision for indeterminate suspension bears an-
other disability in that it precludes an ultimate determination at the
original disciplinary proceeding of the severity of the sanctions to be im-
119. MODEL RULES OF COURT FOR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, § 3.01.81, 81 A.BA.
REP. 470, 488 (1956).
120. Ibid.
121. Reply Brief for Ohio State Bar Association, Amicus Curiae, p. 16, In the Matter of
Amendment of Court Rule No. XXVII (Ohio 1956).
122. Minority Report to MODEL RuLEs, .rupra note 118, at 479.
123. OHIO Sup. CT. R. §5 15 and 21.
124. Ohio Sup. Ct., Disciplinary Docket No. 1 (suspension order issued March 5, 1958;
reinstatement petition filed March 9, 1960).
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posed. A correlation between the seriousness of the offense and the
length of the suspension period cannot be made under the indeterminate sus-
pension provisions. Inappropriately but inevitably, such a determination
will be made in the reinstatement proceeding, for if an applicant's peti-
tion is contested, opposing counsel will naturally seek to expose the
original offense.
For this reason there is needed an amendment to Rule XXVII which
would allow the Board to relate the length of the suspension period to
the seriousness of the attorney's offense. The severity of discipline should
not be determined at the reinstatement hearing but in the original discipli-
nary hearing. Further, if the details of prior misconduct are allowed in
evidence at reinstatement hearings, as the supreme court has intimated
they should be,'25 then the new rule's provision for suspension will be
equivalent to the statutory provision for disbarment. In that event, there
will be no mode of discipline between public reprimand and disbarment.
The opportunity for rehabilitation will hardly exist.
CONCLUSION
Disbarment and suspension proceedings are neither wholly civil nor
wholly criminal in nature but partake of the attributes of each. In some
situations, as in the case of calling respondent for cross-examination, the
rules of evidence for civil proceedings should apply. In other situations,
as in the case of character testimony, the rules of evidence for criminal
proceedings are more appropriate. In a third type of situation, in the
case of transcripts of record from prior civil proceedings, the strict rules
of evidence should not apply. Rather it should be in the hearing panel's
discretion to admit such transcripts in evidence.
Disbarment, suspension and reinstatement proceedings are sui generis.
Character is necessarily in issue in disbarment and suspension proceedings
as an evidentiary fact; in reinstatement proceedings it is in issue as the
ultimate fact. Yet, certain restrictions on character testimony are essen-
tial. In disbarment and suspension proceedings, the introduction of char-
acter testimony should be at the option of the respondent-attorney; in
reinstatement hearings, character testimony should be confined as far as
possible to rehabilitation or to character subsequent to the date of sus-
pension.
Above all, objective standards must be established and uniformly
applied for the conduct of reinstatement hearings. To achieve this end,
an amendment to Rule XXVII's indeterminate suspension provision to
allow for greater flexibility in setting the suspension period is advisable;
a clarification of the meaning of suspension under the rule is imperative.
EDWARD R. BROWN
125. See note 107 supra, and accompanying text.
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